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From	creator	to	data:	the	post-record	music	industry	and	the	digital	conglomerates	Keith	Negus		abstract				This	article	contributes	to	research	on	the	changing	music	industries	by	identifying	three	dynamics	that	underpin	the	shift	towards	a	post-record	music	industry.	First,	it	examines	how	musicians	have	found	themselves	redefined	as	content	providers	rather	than	creative	producers;	a	historical	change	from	recorded	music	as	product	to	content.	Second,	it	focuses	on	tensions	between	YouTube	and	recording	artists	as	symptomatic	of	disputes	about	the	changing	artistic	and	economic	value	of	recorded	music.	Third,	it	extends	this	debate	about	the	market	and	moral	worth	of	music	by	exploring	how	digital	recordings	have	acquired	value	as	data,	rather	than	as	a	commercial	form	of	artistic	expression.	The	article	explores	how	digital	conglomerates	have	become	significant	in	shaping	the	circulation	of	recordings	and	profiting	from	the	work	of	musicians,	and	highlights	dynamics,	structures	and	patterns	of	conflict	shaping	the	recording	sector	specifically,	and	music	industries	more	generally.			Throughout	most	of	the	twentieth	century	recording	was	central	to	the	music	industries.	Driven	by	high	volume	consumer	sales	of	‘sound	carriers’	(LPs,	cassettes,	CDs),	the	recording	sector	became	a	hub	around	which	revolved	publishing,	live	performance,	studio	production,	artistic	management,	radio	promotion,	the	marketing	of	star	imagery,	and	sales	of	merchandise.	The	recording	contract	‘business	model’	dominated.	This	entailed	recoupable	economic	investment	in	musicians	(‘advances’)	with	profits	derived	from	physical	sales,	and	the	licensing	of	copyright	in	sound	recordings	and	published	songs,	and	artists	paid	via	percentage	royalties.	Recording	and	publishing	operated	within	a	blockbuster	economic	structure	(Elberse,	2013)	whereby	a	few	star	artists	accounted	for	most	income	and	the	majority	of	musicians	achieved	neither	critical	acclaim	nor	commercial	reward.			 Facilitated	by	the	buying	power	and	influence	of	the	post-Second	World	War	‘baby	boom’	generation,	the	recorded	music	industry	reached	its	peak	of	incomes	and	significance	with	the	emergence	and	recognition	of	rock	and	soul	music.	This	was	encapsulated	in	the	12-inch	vinyl	album	as	commodity,	and	artistic	statement	in	sound	and	sleeve	imagery,	allied	to	the	concert	as	a	ritualistic	re-enactment	of	the	recording	(unlike	the	looser	relationship	between	recordings	and	live	performance	in	jazz,	for	example).	Financial	losses	from	tours	were	cross-collateralised	against	recording	
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revenues.		Up	to	the	end	of	the	1990s,	scholars	of	music	production	could	justifiably	concentrate	on	recording	as	the	determinate	influence	within	a	wider	set	of	directly	and	indirectly	related	music	industries.		 Recordings	continue	to	be	made.	But	the	period	of	dominance	sustained	by	the	recording	sector	is	over.	The	most	significant	catalyst	of	the	post-record	music	industry	has	been	the	introduction	and	rapid	adoption	of	internet	circulation	and	digital	technology	as	a	means	of	creating	and	curating,	sharing	and	selling,	bundling	and	licensing	access	to	recorded	music.			 The	impact	of	digitalisation	on	music	has	been	and	continues	to	be	debated,	less	as	a	radical	break	with	the	past,	as	many	envisioned	initially	-	whether	they	were	anxiously	pessimistic	or	optimistically	utopian	(Rogers,	2013),	and	more	as	historical	continuity.	To	recap	briefly	as	context	for	the	following	discussion:	From	early	in	the	twenty	first	century	a	familiar	tale	began	to	be	narrated	about	how	the	major	recorded	music	corporations	(along	with	their	representative	trade	organisations)	initially	found	themselves	vacillating,	and	in	conflict	with	entrepreneurs	offering	listeners	the	prospect	of	unregulated	downloading	and	sharing	amongst	peers	(Arditi,	2014;	Morris,	2015a).	Slow	to	recognise	the	significance	of	interventions	from	technologies	and	new	occupational	groupings,	reluctant	to	grasp	the	use	of	recordings	by	fans	and	casual	listeners,	and	frightened	by	the	disregard	for	copyright	law	amongst	sampling	musicians,	the	major	record	labels	prevaricated	(Mulligan,	2015;	Silver,	2013;	Witt,	2015).			 In	their	indecision	the	major	labels	replicated	a	corporate	pattern	of	‘structural	and	organisational	inertia’,	‘institutional	path	dependency’,	and	‘overestimation	of	[their]	power’	-	characteristics	identified	within	many	other	industries	and	sectors	facing	social	and	technological	change	(Dolata,	2011).	Eventually	the	major	record	labels	began	describing	themselves	as	music	companies,	reduced	their	reliance	on	recording	by	restructuring	contracts	as	multiple	rights	(360	degree)	deals,	and	sought	to	recoup	investment	from	the	full	range	of	a	musician’s	activities,	art	forms	and	revenue	streams	(Gervais,	Marcus	&	Kilgore,	2011;	Marshall,	2013).	They	also	negotiated	preferential	licensing	agreements	and	acquired	equity	stakes	in	a	range	of	companies	and	platforms	offering	streamed	access	to	music	(Seabrook,	2014).			
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Yet,	as	the	few,	ever	more	oligopolistic,	major	corporations	began	to	reposition	themselves	as	music	companies	(seeking	profits	from	multiple	rights	rather	than	dwindling	income	from	record	sales)	they	began	to	be	drawn	into	further	tensions	with	newer	digital	conglomerates	of	the	IT	and	data	industry,	sometimes	referred	to	as	Big	Tech	(Mosco,	2017).	These	emergent	tensions	and	their	consequences	are	central	to	this	article,	and	have	received	little	direct	attention	from	scholars	of	the	music	industries.	As	implied,	I	use	the	term	music	industries	(plural)	to	refer	to	the	wide	range	of	companies	and	businesses	seeking	to	profit	from	or	support	the	work	of	musicians,	music	related	products	and	services	(practices,	things	and	activities	that	cannot	be	easily	classed	together	or	substituted	for	one	another	–	a	concert	ticket,	a	mixing	desk,	a	vinyl	album,	sheet	music	and	so	on).	I	use	the	term	industry	(singular)	to	refer	to	a	specific	business	or	sector	involved	in	the	same	product	or	service	–	recorded	music	industry,	publishing	industry,	live	music	industry.		 Studies	of	the	recorded	music	industry	since	digitalisation	have	been	concerned	with	the	responses	and	difficulties	of	record	labels	in	the	face	of	downloading	and	piracy	(Rogers,	2013),	the	impact	and	operations	of	streaming	and	downloading	services	(Morris,	2015a),	and	the	changing	character	of	contracts	(Marshall,	2013).	Few	studies	have	placed	these	changes	within	a	broader	corporate	context.	Two	notable	exceptions	are	David	Hesmondhalgh’s	and	Lesley	Meier’s	(2017)	periodization	of	a	general	historical	shift	from	CE	(consumer	electronics)	to	IT	(information	technology),	and	Jung-yup	Lee’s	focused	study	of	how	the	South	Korean	music	production	was	‘experiencing	digitalisation	at	the	fastest	pace	in	the	world’	in	the	mid-2000s	(2009,	p489).	Lee	stressed	the	impact	of	the	ICT	(information	and	communication	technology)	industries.	Analysing	the	mediation	of	Korean	pop	music	through	the	internet,	the	influence	of	mobile	service	providers,	streaming	services	and	on-line	intermediaries,	Lee	argued	that	‘ongoing	digitalisation	radically	transforms	what	we	conceive	as	the	music	industry,	and	renders	the	nature	of	music	redefined	and	contested’	(2009,	p490).			 This	article	offers	a	further	contribution	to	research	on	the	corporate	contexts	shaping	music	culture,	and	an	intervention	into	debates	about	the	changing	place	of	recorded	music	within	the	wider	digital	or	post-digital	economy.	I	start	by	highlighting	how	musicians	have	found	themselves	redefined	as	‘content	providers’	rather	than	creative	producers;	an	important	historical	change	from	recorded	music	as	product	to	
	 5	
content.	I	then	focus	on	tensions	between	YouTube	and	the	recording	sector	as	indicative	of	disputes	about	the	changing	artistic	and	economic	worth	of	recorded	music.	I	take	this	discussion	further	by	highlighting	how	digital	music	has	become	valued	as	data,	rather	than	a	(commodified)	form	of	artistic	expression.	In	addition	to	these	more	detailed	discussions,	I	wish	to	convey	a	more	general	irony:		Although	most	of	the	digital	conglomerates	have	introduced	music	or	music	video	streaming	services,	and	whilst	they	profit	from	and	impact	upon	the	work	of	musicians,	recorded	music	has	become	less	significant	within	the	hierarchies	of	worth	in	the	digital	economy	as	defined	and	dominated	by	Alphabet	(Google,	YouTube),	Apple,	Amazon,	Microsoft	and	Facebook	–	currently	the	top	five	companies	in	the	world,	measured	by	market	share	(Mosco,	2017,	p65).		My	argument	concentrates	on	one	brief,	but	significant,	moment	in	the	history	of	recorded	music	specifically,	explaining	how	changes	in	the	digital	economy	are	impacting	on	the	practices	and	economic	circumstances	of	musicians.	My	focus	is	geographically	specific	in	that	I	draw	mainly	from	sources	in	the	UK	and	USA.	However,	the	issues	I	am	discussing	are	relevant	to	many	parts	of	the	world	due	to	the	way	digital	conglomerates	are	increasing	their	influence	over	cultural	production	and	the	more	general	circulation	of	information	and	knowledge.			
From	the	creator	of	product	to	curator	of	content		In	a	series	of	interviews	in	the	early	1970s,	Michael	Wale	described	how	a	publicity	department	‘push’	a	‘company’s	product’	(1972,	p262).	He	quoted	a	plugger	explaining	that	he	was	more	likely	to	get	radio	play	for	his	label’s	recordings	if	he	had	‘good	product’	(p289).	Record	label	staff	used	the	word	‘product’	when	referring	to	recordings	delivered	by	musicians	and	the	process	of	packaging,	selling	and	promoting	these	as	singles	or	albums.	The	term	was	an	abbreviation	and	acknowledgement	of	a	process	of	production	(rather	than	a	performance).	Yet	it	was	also	informed	by	a	more	general	lexicon	of	‘product-market’	approaches	to	business	strategy	that	gained	currency	during	the	1960s	with	the	rise	of	management	science,	the	influence	of	organisational	theory	and	adoption	of	‘product	management’.			
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The	term	‘product’	became	routinely	used	in	the	recording	industry	during	the	1980s,	and	the	occupational	title	of	‘product	manager’	became	more	widespread	as	the	strategic	approaches	of	marketing,	accounting	and	business	affairs	gained	ascendency	over	the	less	rationalised	and	‘instinctive’	practices	of	repertoire	management	(songwriting,	arranging	and	production)	and	talent	scouting	(see	Negus,	1992,	1999).	The	idea	of	popular	music	as	a	product	informed	theoretical	models,	whether	scholars	used	the	analogy	of	a	‘production	line’	(Ryan	&	Peterson,	1982)	or	a	‘systems	model’	of	raw	material	being	‘filtered’	as	it	‘flows’	through	a	series	of	gatekeepers	(Hirsch,	1972),	approaches	indebted	to	Theodor	Adorno’s	reference	to	the	‘assembly	line’	like	character	of	cultural	production.		Scholarly	models	of	products	and	production	lines	were	informed	by	empirical	realities	of	the	time.		 For	some	musicians,	the	notion	of	their	creative	work	as	‘product’	brought	to	mind	these	unsavoury	images	of	factories	and	assembly	lines.	Yet,	the	industry	was	organised	according	to	the	manufacture	of	tangible	artefacts.	Producing	recorded	music	required	the	maintenance	of	a	costly	infrastructure	of	record	pressing	plants	(later	security	ringed	CD	production	complexes),	warehouses,	inventory	management	systems,	and	a	complex	of	land,	sea	and	air	transportation	routes	and	hubs.			 The	manufacturing	and	distribution	process	could	not	idle	while	an	artist	took	their	time	to	deliver	a	track	or	an	album.	A	senior	executive	I	interviewed	in	April	1989	recalled	a	time	working	for	a	label	with	its	own	record	pressing	plant	and	explained:	‘I’d	get	a	call	from	manufacturing	and	they’d	say	“we	need	product”.	And	I’d	say	“well,	I	don’t	know	if	I	have	any”,	and	there’d	be	a	scream	down	the	phone.	If	I	didn’t	have	a	single	or	album	ready	I’d	have	to	find	one,	just	to	keep	the	machines	turning’	(Shepherd,	1989).	A	pressing	plant	needed	to	keep	staff	busy.	The	contracts	with	road	haulage	and	shipping	needed	fulfilling.		The	warehouse	space	needed	filling	and	emptying.	The	racks	on	the	retail	shelves	demanded	new	singles	and	albums,	whilst	unmarketable	product	went	to	traders	feeding	off	record	industry	‘failures’	by	selling	to	aficionados	of	the	‘bargain	bin.’		 The	term	‘product’	was	not	simply	an	ideological	distortion	of	a	purer	activity	of	artistic	creation	but	a	metonym	for	the	entire	way	that	commercial	recording	was	organised.	Production	and	product	-	the	specific	space	of	the	studio	and	the	more	general	manufacture	and	shipment	of	sound	carriers	-	mediated	the	composition,	consumption	
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and	performance	of	music.	The	term	product	acknowledged	the	fusion	of	both	the	sound	and	the	‘sound	carrier’.				 The	idea	of	music	as	‘product’	implied	material	objects	‘containing’	music.	It	suggested	a	process	of	creation	and	authorship,	and	identifiable	‘record	producers.’	It	acknowledged	the	creative	labour	invested	in	the	physical	artefact.	The	listener	could	recognise	a	musician’s	work	in	a	tangible	way,	whether	in	a	small	single	record	placed	on	to	a	turntable	or	a	lavishly	adorned	album	package	carried	under	the	arm.			 The	re-description	of	recorded	music	as	‘content’	suggests	a	generic	type	of	information	that	simply	appears	for	the	benefit	of	‘users’.	The	digital	track,	‘un-bundled’	from	its	location	within	an	album,	is	another	bit	of	information	to	be	accessed	on	a	computer	or	mobile	device.	The	idea	of	content	detaches	the	entity	-	a	song,	a	symphony	(a	painting,	or	poem)	-	from	its	authorship	and	its	making	and	towards	its	constituents	(lyric	content)	in	much	the	same	way	that	the	term	content	is	used	casually	and	more	generically	-	fat	content,	sugar	content,	adult	content.			 A	product	is	manufactured,	packaged,	promoted	and	purchased.	Each	step	in	this	linear	chain	entails	an	identifiable	economic	transaction	and	potential	point	of	profit	for	different	intermediaries	and	occupational	groups.	In	contrast,	digital	content	is	uploaded,	circulated	in	the	hope	that	it	will	be	‘used’	in	a	manner	that	allows	it	to	be	‘monetized’	(an	opaque	buzzword	for	generating	revenue).	As	John	Lanchester	has	commented:	‘In	the	internet	world,	companies	often	seek	growth	first	….	the	strategy	for	monetising	the	product	comes	later.	This	is	a	sensationally	good	way	of	going	broke’	(2014,	p186).	It	is	also	a	tactic	for	wasting	resources	in	circulating	an	ever-greater	number	of	recordings	that	will	never	be	heard	let	alone	‘monetised’.			 A	recording	industry	organised	according	to	the	manufacture	of	physical	product	was	constrained	and	limited.	When	the	machines	required	product,	the	amount	of	vinyl	or	CDs	that	could	be	manufactured	was	finite;	limited	by	materials	and	machines,	along	with	space	in	warehouses	and	retailers.	In	contrast,	digital	content	is	almost	infinite,	a	quality	that	has	led	to	pronouncements	of	a	shift	from	scarcity	to	abundance	(whether	a	profusion	of	songs,	news	stories	or	photographs).	This	is	borne	out	by	evidence	of	the	quantity	of	recorded	tracks	available	or	‘released’	and	the	number	of	self	declared	musicians	active	in	
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the	economy.	In	the	UK,	in	1994	the	number	of	newly	released	albums	was	reported	by	the	Official	Charts	Company	as	11,654.	In	2014	that	figure	had	risen	to	47,751.	In	1965	the	Performing	Right	Society	had	a	membership	of	approximately	6,000	songwriters	and	composers.	By	2015	this	was	approximately	112,000.	In	relative	terms,	PRS	income	had	dramatically	declined.	The	collecting	society	was	sharing	the	equivalent	of	a	much	smaller	total.	At	2015	prices,	this	was	equivalent	to	approximately	£16,600	per	songwriter/	composer	in	1965	and	£5,900	in	2015	(see	Hunter-Tilney,	2015).	Anita	Elberse	reported	that	of	the	eight	million	digital	tracks	sold	in	the	USA	in	2011,	94	per	cent	sold	fewer	than	100	units,	and	32	per	cent	sold	only	one	copy	(p160).	The	overabundance	of	content	has	increased	in	subsequent	years.			 In	an	age	of	abundance	the	curator	becomes	more	significant	than	the	creator.	The	playlist	becomes	more	culturally	and	commercially	important	than	the	idea	of	the	album	as	artistic	statement	and	commodity.	In	2017	Drake	referred	to	his	new	release	More	Life	as	a	‘playlist’	rather	than	an	album,	acknowledging	a	broader	shift	in	public	preference	for	playlists	of	music	defined	by	genre	and	activity	(workout,	chill,	party,	roadtrip,	walking)	rather	than	specific	performer	identity	(Hogan,	2015a).	Yet	this	also	signalled	a	clear	continuity	with	the	way	albums	have,	in	many	ways,	always	been	‘playlists’	since	the	early	boom	of	mood	music	LPs	in	the	early	1950s	(Keightley,	2004)	and	Frank	Sinatra’s	influential	musically	themed	concept	albums	that	began	appearing	as	78rpm	disc	collections	from	1946	(Granata,	2004).	Playlists	are	also	a	legacy	of	radio	programming,	used	since	the	1950s	as	a	way	of	framing	the	range	of	music	played	and	identity	of	a	particular	broadcasting	station.		 The	playlist	is	partly	a	response	to	the	changing	preferences	of	listeners,	indebted	to	the	practices	of	peer	to	peer	sharing,	facilitated	by	Napster,	when	music	fans	quickly	began	compiling	their	own	lists,	selecting	from	rather	than	accepting	the	sequences	of	tracks	on	released	albums	(Morris,	2015a).	A	new	commercial	role	has	emerged	for	professional	curators,	adding	brand	identity	to	streaming	platforms	(Morris	&	Powers,	2015),	offering	selections	from	an	ocean	of	available	songs.	Curating	is	also	continuous	with	the	role	of	DJs	and	music	journalists.	For	example,	rock	critic	Robert	Christgau’s	curatorial	‘consumer	guide’	was	introduced	in	New	York’s	Village	Voice	in	1969.			
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Product	was	listened	to	on	dedicated	music	players,	from	the	cylindrical	phonograph	through	to	the	gramophone	and	hi-fi.	The	iPod,	with	its	store	of	digital	music,	was	the	last	dedicated	music	player	-	an	important	transitory	moment	in	the	journey	from	physical	sound	carrier	to	digital	data.	The	conspicuous	physical	presence	of	the	phonograph	-	around	which	people	ritualistically	congregated	or	sat	alone	in	‘ceremonies	of	a	solitary’	(Eisenberg,	1988)	-	is	supplanted	by	unobtrusive	ambient	content	accessible	on	mobile	devices.	As	content	on	computers	or	phones	supersedes	product	on	phonographs,	new	corporate	conflicts	emerge.	I	now	move	on	to	how	tensions	between	product	and	content	result	in	conflicts	that	pitch	recording	companies,	music	publishers	and	musicians	against	the	new	digital	conglomerates,	most	conspicuously	YouTube/	Google.		
Recordings,	YouTube	and	the	moral	economy	of	musical	value		In	previous	academic	research	and	criticism,	record	labels	have	often	been	portrayed	as	unsympathetic	to	the	interests	and	creative	whims	of	musicians.	An	argument,	informed	by	political	economy,	has	pitched	musicians	against	music	corporations	as	an	artistic	version	of	the	struggle	between	capital	and	labour	(see,	for	example,	Chapple	&	Garofalo,	1977).	Evidence	to	support	the	endurance	of	this	tension	can	be	marshalled	from	court	cases,	with	notable	disputes	with	labels	involving	George	Michael,	Prince,	Dr	Dre,	Kesha,	Trent	Reznor	and	Pink	Floyd	(to	name	some	of	the	most	prominent).			 However,	emergent	tensions	have	begun	to	unite	musicians	with	the	traditional	music	industries	(recorded	and	publishing	most	obviously)	against	the	newer	digital	conglomerates.	During	2016	the	grievances	of	musicians	coalesced	with	the	concerns	of	representatives	of	the	recorded	music	sector,	forming	a	chorus	of	complaint	about	the	use	of	music	on	various	streaming	services.	YouTube	was	singled	out	for	most	criticism,	publicly	condemned	in	a	campaign	orchestrated	by	the	Featured	Artists	Coalition	(whose	Board	included	Annie	Lennox	and	Ed	O’Brien),	and	in	a	letter	delivered	to	the	European	Commission,	signed	by	Paul	McCartney,	Coldplay,	Lady	Gaga	and	others	(Hogan,	2016;	Peoples,	2016).			 Building	on	a	history	of	links	between	moving	image	media	and	music,	notably	MTV,	the	relationship	between	YouTube	and	music	companies	has	always	been	one	of	
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‘mutual	antagonism	and	mutual	dependency’	(Forde,	2016,	np).	Since	its	launch	in	2005	by	former	employees	of	PayPal	and	acquisition	by	Google	the	following	year,	YouTube	has	become	pivotal	for	disseminating	songs	and	images,	for	identifying	audiences	and	for	building	a	‘fan	base’	(Wasko	&	Erickson,	2009).	Yet,	musicians,	publishers	and	labels	have	habitually	complained	that	they	should	be	receiving	greater	financial	payments	in	addition	to	promotion	and	publicity.		 The	issue	became	articulated	in	the	idea	of	a	‘value	gap’.	The	recording	industry	and	its	artists	argued	that	there	was	an	unfair	imbalance	between	profits	made	and	revenues	passed	on	to	musicians	and	music	companies.	The	shortfall	–	the	gap	-	resulted	in	music	companies	having	reduced	income	available	for	reinvestment	in	new	artists;	a	risk	that	content	users	were	not	facing	(Dredge,	2016).	One	aspect	of	the	dispute	entailed	the	complaint	that	a	streamed	song	is	not	adequately	rewarded	financially.	The	same	basic	grievance	has	been	levelled	at	other	streaming	platforms,	most	notably	Spotify,	whereby	musicians	and	labels	familiar	with	previously	liberal	revenues	from	‘unit’	sales	and	radio	broadcasting	have	been	aghast	at	the	relatively	small	size	of	payments	when	expressed	as	a	percentage	return	against	individual	streams	(see	Marshall,	2015;	Milne,	2014).			 The	dispute	about	payments	for	streamed	music	is	underpinned	by	an	unexamined	ontological	question	about	what	exactly	a	stream	is.	It	is	not	equivalent	to	a	‘unit’	sale.	It	is	not	comparable	to	a	physical	recording	being	‘played’	on	radio.	Evidence	from	streaming	data	suggests	that	listener’s	appreciate	their	ability	to	access	only	a	small	part	of	any	track,	with	just	under	25	per	cent	of	tracks	skipped	in	the	first	five	seconds	and	35	per	cent	skipped	within	the	first	30	seconds	(Lamere,	2014).	The	purchased,	downloaded	and	saved	digital	music	file	may	or	may	not	be	an	artefact	(Sterne,	2006),	but	streamed	music	is	not	experienced	by	listeners	in	a	manner	consonant	with	how	musicians	perceive	recording	as	a	repository	of	the	creative	time	and	effort	invested	in	composing	and	producing.	For	musicians	and	their	representatives,	the	issue	is	exacerbated	by	the	way	a	‘safe	harbour’	clause	allows	YouTube	to	evade	legal	culpability	(and	hence	financial	responsibility)	for	‘user	generated’	content	that	freely	incorporates	unauthorised	existing	copyrightable	material.		 YouTube	initially	reacted	to	the	value	gap	grievance	by	stating	that	they	were	making	a	return	to	musicians	and	labels	(using	software	to	identify	tracks),	stressing	how	
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labels	also	receive	substantial	income	from	the	advertising	that	accompanies	videos;	a	source	of	revenue	indebted	to	Doug	Morris’s	negotiations	when	head	of	Universal	Music	in	2007	(Witt,	2015).	However,	record	companies	and	publishers	disputed	the	figures.	In	November	2014,	when	early	complaints	were	being	voiced,	I	was	told	by	a	member	of	a	music	trade	organisation	(who	wished	to	remain	anonymous)	that	YouTube	was	under-reporting	the	volume	of	recordings	being	streamed,	a	concern	alluded	to	in	other	sources	(for	example,	Mulligan,	2016a).	Despite	requests	I	was	unable	to	obtain	any	evidence	to	verify	this	perception.	The	recording	industry	did	not	make	publicly	available	any	detailed	information	beyond	the	routinely	voiced	claims	of	record	executives,	such	as	Jimmy	Iovine,	that	music	was	making	up	as	much	as	40	per	cent	of	YouTube	content	(Garrahan,	2016).			 The	recording	and	music	publishing	perspective	was	in	stark	contrast	to	research	conducted	in	2016	by	Pexeso	which	reported	that	music	videos	and	music-related	video	content	was	4.3	per	cent	of	YouTube	‘traffic’,	compared	with	33.4	per	cent	for	gaming,	for	example	(Resnikoff,	2016).	This	was	followed	up	in	the	middle	of	2017	by	YouTube’s	parent	company	Google	commissioning	RBB	Economics	to	provide	further	research	‘evidence’	to	support	their	standpoint.	This	report,	published	in	5	sections,	entitled	Value	
of	YouTube	to	the	music	industry	(RBB,	2017),	used	online	surveys	with	1,500	listeners,	tracked	5,000	songs	in	4	European	countries	over	3	years	and	analysed	data	on	YouTube	streams.	Unsurprisingly,	the	findings	were	overwhelming	positive	about	YouTube	and	stated	that	it	allowed	a	diversity	of	music	to	reach	listeners	(notably	by	older,	and	by	less	well	known	artists);	it	helped	listeners	discover	new	artists,	and	facilitated	breaking	new	acts.	As	a	promotional	medium	it	provided	‘value	added’	benefits	by	increasing	streams	and	downloads	on	other	paid	services	and	contributing	to	longer	‘song	life	cycles’.	Ultimately,	RBB	reported	that	YouTube	‘provides	substantial	direct	revenues	to	the	music	industry,	amounting	to	some	USD	1	billion	in	2016’	(RBB,	2017,	Paper	5,	p17).			 YouTube	acted	further	by	appointing	Lyor	Cohen,	an	ex-senior	executive	of	Warner	Music	and	Def	Jam	as	‘global	head	of	music’	with	the	reported	aim	of	‘building	bridges’	due	to	his	familiarity	with	the	problems	and	perspectives	of	record	labels	and	publishers	(Rys,	2016).	However,	attitudes	soon	divided	with	some	suspicious	voices	muttering	that	he	was	providing	insider	knowledge	to	the	benefit	of	YouTube,	or	that	he	was	going	to	start	dealing	directly	with	musicians	and	fracture	the	relationship	between	record	labels	and	artists.		
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	 The	recording	industry	and	YouTube	were	splitting	along	a	broader	schism.	On	one	side,	the	‘business	model’	of	investment	in	artistic	production,	remuneration	through	copyrights	and	unit	sales	within	the	recording	and	publishing	industries.	On	the	other	side,	a	model	of	generating	income	from	the	way	‘content’	attracts	advertising,	a	model	deployed	lucratively	by	the	new	digital	conglomerates	(and	drawing	on	the	earlier	use	of	advertising	to	finance	commercial	radio	and	television).		 Neal	Mohan	(2016),	Chief	Product	Officer	at	YouTube	and	Senior	Vice	President,	Google,	argued	that	YouTube	was	demonstrating	the	potential	of	advertising	generated	revenue.	He	claimed	that	80	per	cent	of	music	listeners	are	casual	listeners	and	it	is	these	that	can	generate	bulk	money	from	advertising,	rather	than	relying	on	revenues	generated	from	targeting	recordings	at	fans.	In	contrast	to	Mohan,	Joe	Lennon,	CEO	Subwoofr,	(to	cite	one	proponent	of	this	counter-argument),	claimed	that	advertising	requires	a	lot	more	consumption	to	generate	revenue.	Instead,	he	argued	against	targeting	casual	listeners	and	for	a	focus	on	fans,	directing	attention	at	those	actively	spending	money	on	music.	Drawing	on	research	by	Nielsen,	Lennon	(2016)	argued	that	40	per	cent	of	music	consumers	are	fans,	with	an	additional	category	of	aficionados	(a	lower	percentage	of	14	per	cent	of	music	consumers)	accounting	for	34	per	cent	of	recording	industry	revenues.		 Statistics	can	be	used	to	support	various	arguments.	If	these	numbers	are	treated	less	as	indicators	of	the	real	world	and	instead	as	business	constructions	that	are	used	in	imagining	and	disagreeing	about	the	markets	for	music,	what	we	have	here	are	arguments	about	the	characteristics	of	music	consumption,	and	the	most	viable	model	of	revenue	generation.	One	contention	is	that	the	music	industries	should	concentrate	on	the	habits	of	the	casual	music	listener;	the	person	satisfied	to	access	recordings	in	bundled	packages	or	‘free’	platforms	with	little	direct	economic	outlay.	It	is	in	this	area,	it	is	claimed,	that	large	revenues	can	be	generated	from	advertising	based	models.	In	contrast	is	the	assertion	that	it	is	more	advantageous	to	focus	efforts	on	analysing	and	targeting	the	activities	of	the	dedicated	aficionados,	those	who	invest	time	and	money	on	recordings	(digital	and	physical),	artefacts,	merchandise	and	concert	tickets.	Although	a	numerically	smaller	constituency	of	people,	fans	place	greater	importance	on	music,	are	more	committed	and	provide	the	most	reliable	source	of	revenue	for	the	traditional	sectors	of	recording,	publishing	and	live	performance.	This	‘model’	is	also	based	on	musicians’	experiences	and	
	 13	
perceptions	of	the	importance	of	active	music	fans	for	their	critical	and	commercial	success.	Fan	engagement	with	product	and	performance	is	visible	and	audible	to	musicians,	unlike	the	casual	listener	clicking	on	adverts	and	skipping	in	and	out	of	various	music	related	content.		 Recording	and	publishing	have	been	central	to	how	generations	of	popular	musicians	have	experienced	their	art,	obtained	investment	and	made	a	living.	The	potentially	huge	revenues	realisable	from	live	performances	in	big	arenas	and	stadiums,	lucrative	brand	endorsements,	and	income	from	merchandise,	tend	to	be	possible	only	for	the	minority	of	established	major	superstars	(Hogan,	2015b).	For	pragmatic	reasons,	the	majority	of	musicians	and	their	representatives	have	been	attached	to	making	a	living	from	the	sales	and	rights	to	‘units’	whereby	payment	is	made	for	purchasing	and	listening	to	individual	songs	or	instrumental	tracks.	If	a	song	or	collection	of	songs	is	purchased	as	CD,	vinyl	or	download	a	payment	should	be	made	to	label	and	musician.	If	a	song	is	heard	in	public	a	royalty	payment	should	be	made	to	publisher,	record	label	and	musician.	It	is	this	‘business	model’	that	is	challenged	by	YouTube.	Underlying	it	is	a	contrast	between	the	musician-as-artist’s	belief	in	their	music	as	a	means	of	expression	and	a	point	of	public	identification,	and	the	casual	listener’s	distracted	skipping	through	an	ambient	flow	of	content	where	music	is	often	decontextualized	and	irrelevant.			 The	new	digital	conglomerates,	such	as	YouTube,	have	developed	a	model	of	charging	for	access	to	a	bounded	platform	for	various	types	of	bundled	content,	and	generating	income	from	the	advertising	that	intervenes	in	that	content;	a	musician’s	worth	and	hence	their	income	will	come	from	how	they	attract	advertising.	This	is	a	stark	contrast	to	the	musician’s	and	the	recording	industry’s	assumptions	about	music	being	measured	according	to	sales	and	rights	that	recognise	the	individual	creations	of	musicians.			 There	is	not	simply	a	commercial	logic	at	stake	here,	but	an	ethical	mediation	of	the	market	via	a	moral	economy	of	artistic	worth.	The	idea	that	economic	transactions	are	mediated	by	ethics	can	be	traced	back	to	debates	about	‘moral	economy’	during	the	eighteenth	century,	a	concept	deployed	by	E	P	Thompson	(1991)	when	narrating	a	history	of	how	workers	and	consumers	asserted	their	right	to	intervene	in	price	setting,	and	vividly	evoked	in	his	studies	of	riots	over	the	price	of	corn	in	the	late	eighteenth	century.	
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Thompson	used	the	term	specifically	to	refer	to	‘confrontations	in	the	market	place	over	access	(or	entitlement)	to	“necessities”	–	essential	food’	(1991,	p337),	although	he	acknowledged	that	the	concept	could	be	developed	and	applied	in	other	circumstances.	
Thompson	identified	the	market	as	the	point	at	which	exploitation	can	be	identified,	and	when	opposition	can	be	voiced,	observing;	‘too	often	discourse	about	“the	market”	conveys	the	sense	of	something	definite’,	when	it	is	more	often	‘a	metaphor	of	economic	process,	or	an	idealisation	or	abstraction	from	that	process’	(1991,	p273).	The	valuing	of	non-market	endeavour,	informed	by	a	Romantic	aesthetic	(a	legacy	of	the	artistic	response	to	industrial	capitalism),	has	been	an	enduring	sensibility	amongst	popular	musicians	throughout	the	era	of	recorded	music	(Frith,	1988,	1996).	The	radical	aesthetic	experiments	and	innovations	of	jazz,	rock	and	rap	have	not	simply	been	counter	to	a	commercial	or	capitalist	logic	but	frequently	constitutive	of	the	market.	The	value	gap	dispute	is	an	illustration	of	the	struggles	through	which	the	creative	is	esteemed	socially	and	economically.		It	concerns	the	social	and	artistic	value	of	music,	how	this	should	be	recognised	and	rewarded,	and	how	music	should	be	circulated	within	digital	networks	that	apparently	allow	the	‘free’	flow	of	ideas	and	information.	These	ethical	struggles	underpin	and	inform	arguments	about	how	music	should	be	distributed	(sold,	accessed	via	subscription,	bundled	with	other	services	and	products,	or	offered	‘free’),	and	the	type	of	payment	and	price	for	that	form	of	distribution	(a	license	or	royalty	for	a	stream	or	download	sale,	or	a	cut	of	advertising	revenue).		
From	music	as	art	to	music	as	data		The	recording	industry	and	new	digital	conglomerates	diverge	on	more	than	remuneration	and	the	morals	of	the	market.	For	musicians	and	their	representatives,	performing	and	recording	constitute	an	art	form.	For	all	the	criticism	the	music	industries	have	received	over	the	years	from	aggrieved	fans,	journalists	and	performers,	and	despite	its	corporate	structures,	the	commercial	worlds	of	recording	and	publishing	have	been	indelibly	infused	with	the	aesthetic	sensibilities	of	blues,	Romanticism	and	pop	art	Modernism.	From	big	band	jazz	and	the	solo	singer	of	the	1920s-30s	and	onwards	the	recorded	labels	have	made	an	economic	and	affective	investment	in	musicians	as	creative	practitioners	able	to	produce	music	that	is	potentially,	and	often	demonstrably,	radical	whilst	being	expressive	of	individual,	and	collective	identities.		
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	 In	contrast,	digital	conglomerates	are	driven	by	a	tougher	cocktail	of	ruthless	entrepreneurialism,	obsessive	corporate	imaging,	contractual	secrecy,	and	the	cult	of	personality	(Steve	Jobs,	Bill	Gates,	Mark	Zuckerberg,	Jeff	Bezos).	The	artistic	qualities	and	effort	that	has	gone	in	to	the	composition,	production	and	performance	of	music	are	irrelevant	to	how	digital	conglomerates	make	money.	As	I	have	argued,	the	dispute	between	musicians	and	YouTube	is,	at	one	profound	level,	about	recognising	the	artistic	relevance	and	social	value	of	music.	For	the	digital	conglomerates	music	is	‘content’	that	attracts	subscriptions	and	‘traffic’.	It	is	a	‘customer	engagement	tool’	(Seabrook,	2014).	Music	is	a	means	to	another	end	rather	than	an	end	in	itself.			 The	squabble	over	advertising	and	rights	may	have	created	waves	in	recording	and	publishing,	but	these	are	ripples	for	digital	conglomerates	when	considered	with	the	other	ways	they	generate	income.	The	emergent	tensions	that	I	have	been	referring	to	in	this	article	can	be	thrown	into	sharper	relief	by	considering,	albeit	schematically	given	space,	the	broader	ways	that	the	digital	conglomerates	generate	revenue.		 First,	is	the	generation	of	revenue	from	advertising,	with	Alphabet/	Google	and	Facebook	accounting	for	over	50	per	cent	of	global	internet	advertising	(Fortune,	2017).	Regular	reports	suggest	that	advertising	accounts	for	approximately	90	per	cent	of	Google/	Alphabet	and	95	per	cent	of	Facebook	income,	with	revenue	from	advertising	providing	significant	returns	for	Amazon	and	Microsoft	(Mosco,	2017).	Advertising	revenue	has	allowed	the	likes	of	Google	and	Facebook	to	build	corporate	structures	and	to	exert	influence.	But,	the	aspirations	of	the	digital	conglomerates	lead	way	beyond	advertising.	The	disputes	with	the	music	industry	should	be	considered	alongside	the	other	ways	in	which	these	corporations	are	generating	revenue	and	exerting	power	over	production	and	consumption.			 After	advertising,	an	important	way	that	revenue	is	generated	is	through	the	production	and	sales	of	physical	products.	Phones,	mobile	devices	and	laptops,	along	with	Beats	headphones,	have	been	central	to	the	financial	dominance	of	Apple,	and	important	for	Amazon	and	Google.	Digital	conglomerates	also	generate	revenues	from	the	production,	management	and	maintenance	of	servers	and	data	storage	systems,	used	by	many	big	corporations	along	with	governments	and	charities	(Mosco,	2014).	Cloud	
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computing	is	also	a	lucrative	source	of	revenue	for	Microsoft,	shrewdly	making	its	business	applications	software	(word	processing,	spread	sheets)	ever	more	integrated	into	cloud	computing,	and	Amazon	whose	Web	Services	cloud	computing	network	has	become	the	‘global	leader	in	cloud	computing’	(Mosco,	2017,	p70).	Amazon’s	involvement	in	physical	products	also	encompasses	digital	retailing	of	ever	more	consumer	luxuries	and	daily	necessities,	a	domain	in	which	it	has	been	able	to	exert	an	almost	near	monopoly.			 Digital	conglomerates	are	expanding	their	portfolios	through	research	and	development	spending	(invested	at	a	strategic	loss)	in	new	products	that	are	predicated	upon	entering	production	and	being	sold	within	coming	years.	This	includes	types	of	virtual	and	immersive	technology,	robotics,	‘intelligent’	electric	automobiles,	banking	systems,	information	management,	artificial	intelligence,	and	heath	care	systems.	Big	tech	companies	are	using	their	expertise	and	access	to	sophisticated	skills	in	technology	and	engineering,	hardware	and	software,	often	through	strategic	alliances	(such	as	that	between	Facebook,	Walmart	and	Uber,	or	Amazon’s	many	deals	with	third	parties),	and	exploiting	their	access	to	labourers	mining	raw	materials	in	Africa,	or	working	on	assembly	lines	in	Asia.		 Digital	conglomerates	exert	further	influence	and	generate	income	through	the	production,	acquisition	and	curatorial	mediation	of	apps	and	software.	Dominated	by	Apple	and	Google,	the	revenues	generated	by	the	‘app	economy’	in	the	USA	are	estimated	to	be	greater	than	Hollywood,	with	Apple	figures	suggesting	that	the	App	Store	was	supporting	627,000	jobs	compared	with	374,000	employed	in	jobs	created	by	Hollywood	(Meyer,	2015).	The	app	economy	is	expected	to	grow	considerably,	not	only	in	leisure	activities	such	as	games,	personal	communication	and	the	sharing	of	images,	but	in	apps	used	widely	in	workplaces,	schools,	college	and	universities,	in	navigation,	and	in	finance	and	banking.	The	expansion	of	the	app	economy	is,	in	turn,	entwined	with	an	obsessive	investment	in	the	potential	of	an	‘internet	of	things’	summarised	by	Vincent	Mosco	as	‘a	system	for	measuring,	monitoring,	and	controlling	the	activity	of	objects	and	living	organisms	through	sensors	that	gather,	process,	and	report	data	over	networks’	(2017,	p39).		 One	stark	consequences	of	this	broader	corporate	context	is	the	simple	fact	that	recorded	music	is	insignificant	within	the	broader	digital	economy.	Presenting	figures	
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from	2013	to	2016	(along	with	future	projections)	Mark	Mulligan	provided	evidence	suggesting	that	‘music’s	role	in	the	global	digital	content	marketplace	is	small	and	shrinking’	(2016b,	np).	The	financial	value	of	digital	recorded	music	is	slight	and	declining	as	a	percentage	share	in	relation	to	apps	and	videos.	This	is	perhaps	an	obvious	reason	why	the	big	tech	companies	(such	as	Google	and	Amazon)	are	prepared	to	invest	in	the	production	of	videos	for	vloggers,	along	with	movies	and	screen	drama	but	not	in	the	production	of	music.	Not	only	is	recorded	music	relatively	insignificant	within	the	overall	digital	economy,	access	to	listening	is	often	purchased	as	a	generic	subscription	to	a	bundle	of	content	and	apps,	often	packaged	with	a	phone	or	mobile	device.	The	recording	is	not	chosen	and	purchased	as	an	entity	in	itself,	but	is	accessed	and	paid	for	within	an	overall	fee	for	generic	‘data	usage’.		 Yet,	at	the	moment	when	music	becomes	less	significant	as	a	recorded	art	within	the	broader	app	and	content	economy,	its	very	use	as	data	means	that	it	begins	to	gain	importance	within	‘data	capitalism’.	Digital	conglomerates	exploit	recorded	music	as	part	of	the	production,	analysis,	packaging	and	selling	of	data,	and	in	the	management	of	data	for	third	parties	(labels,	publishers	etc.).	Information	derived	from	the	circulation	and	use	of	music	becomes	integrated	in	to	a	system	within	which	digital	conglomerates	harness	‘big	data’	to	comprehend,	control	and	anticipate	behaviour	through	forms	of	‘digital	positivism’	(Mosco,	2014).			 Robert	Prey	has	highlighted	how	‘all	listening	time	is	data-generating	time’	(2016,	p32).	Jeremy	Wade	Morris	(2015b)	has	made	a	similar	point	when	stressing	how	media	metrics	companies	manufacture	‘commodity	communities’	as	they	package	and	sell	audience	data	to	other	companies.	Digital	music	can	provide	three	distinct	types	of	data.			 First,	is	data	about	the	characteristics	of	listeners	identified	by	such	criteria	as	location,	time	of	accessing	music,	repeated	listens	to	the	same	track	or	artist,	adjustment	of	volume,	range	of	musical	preference	(eclectic,	narrow,	new	or	old	artists),	and	all	manner	of	patterns	of	related	hardware,	software	and	internet	activity.	Listener	engagement	with	specific	genres,	artists	or	songs	can	be	cross-correlated	with	significant	events	(military	conflict,	royal	wedding),	controversial	news	stories,	marketing	campaigns	or	a	performer’s	touring	and	promotional	activities.			
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Second,	digital	music	consumption	provides	the	opportunity	for	‘semantic	analysis	of	online	conversations	about	music’	(Prey,	2016,	p33).	This	entails	collecting	and	analysing	the	words	used	and	descriptions	about	musicians	and	bands	in	articles,	reviews,	blogs,	forums	and	across	social	media	platforms.	This	is	sifted	and	can	be	reduced	to	recurring	keywords,	and	dissected	to	construct	networks	or	webs	of	connections	between	artists,	between	songs	and	between	listeners	in	different	places.	Semantic	data	research	also	includes	collecting	and	analysing	the	compilation	of	playlists	by	users	and	exploiting	the	links	that	listeners	make	between	music	and	activity,	such	as	cleaning,	school	work,	rainy	days,	late	night,	running,	commute.			 Third,	is	the	analysis	of	the	sonic	content	of	digital	music	whereby	individual	songs	or	tracks	can	be	analysed	and	compared	for	obvious	traits	such	as	melody,	harmony,	rhythm	and	pitch,	along	with	the	instruments	used,	gender	of	vocalist	and	stylistic	characteristics,	such	as	danceability	or	use	of	distortion.	Pandora	Internet	Radio’s	Music	Genome	Project	makes	use	of	teams	of	musicologists	to	collect	details	of	every	track	according	to	450	identifiable	characteristics	(although	not	all	are	applied	to	every	genre	or	recording).	The	Echo	Nest	(now	owned	by	Spotify)	analyses	data	from	approximately	40	million	songs	and	also	allows	the	analysis	of	tracks	and	makes	available	various	apps	that	allow	consumers	to	link	to	related	songs	and	styles.			 Sonic	analytics	are	used	to	algorithmically	manipulate	streamed	listening	behaviour,	making	it	appear	more	‘personal’	by	providing	constant	suggestions,	and	by	allowing	listeners	to	engage	in	novelties	related	to	their	listening	(accessing	sequences	of	songs	with	the	same	beat,	taking	a	sonic	journey	to	related	genres),	flattering	the	individual	on	their	unique	profile.	This	data	is	also	cross-referenced	and	combined	with	semantic	and	listener	data	when	linking	listener	activities	to	the	interests	of	advertisers.	For	example,	data	collected	on	individual	listeners	is	reconfigured	by	Pandora	and	sold	to	advertisers	as	‘2300	targetable	audience	segments’	(Prey,	2017,	p8).			 Due	to	the	amount	of	data	being	produced,	the	structuring	of	various	deals,	alliances	and	collaborative	ventures	between	companies	in	the	big	tech	sector,	this	data	can	then	be	combined	with,	or	cross-referenced	and	‘migrated’	to	other	data	sets.	This	can	then	lead	to	‘function	creep’	whereby	data	and	technology	that	is	developed	for	one	apparent	use	is	deployed	more	widely	with	other	data,	a	practice	that	has	caused	concern	
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in	discussions	of	government	surveillance,	privacy	and	human	rights	(see	Bernal,	2016).	Music	listening	data	by	itself	can	be	used	to	predict	streaming	and	purchasing	behaviour,	to	mitigate	corporate	anxiety	about	uncertainty	through	‘risk	management’	(Negus,	2014)	and	to	generate	income	when	sold	on	to	advertisers	(seeking	to	place	ads	for	sportswear	or	automobiles	alongside	playlists).	It	can	also	be	correlated	with	a	‘bewildering	array’	of	other	indicators	when	data	miners	seek	predictors	of	credit	worthiness,	home	ownership	or	leisure	activities	(Prey,	2016).			 The	post-record	music	industry	offers	an	abundance	of	data	that	is	exploited	by	digital	conglomerates	and	infomediaries.	The	dispute	about	whether	revenue	is	more	fairly	extracted	from	advertising	or	the	enforcement	of	copyrights	is	just	one	scuffle	within	a	broader	set	of	tensions	about	the	value	of	recorded	music,	the	characteristics	that	make	it	valuable	and	the	way	worth	should	be	acknowledged,	both	culturally	and	economically.			 Musicians,	labels	and	publishers	have	been	campaigning	for	recorded	music	to	be	recognised	for	its	creative	and	artistic	value	(rather	than	as	content	that	attracts	traffic)	and	to	be	accorded	greater	economic	reward.	As	the	digital	conglomerates	continue	to	influence	the	conditions	within	which	music	is	circulated	and	consumed,	there	are	further	conflicts	imminent	about	how	musicians	and	music	companies	should	be	recompensed	for	the	data	value	of	their	music.	
	
Diversity	and	divergence	in	the	post-record	music	industries		In	the	post-record	music	industries	the	recording	is	displaced	–	as	art	form,	as	artefact,	as	tangible	commodity.	Musicians	still	make	recordings,	and	these	are	commodified	in	new	and	in	old	ways.	But,	the	record	is	no	longer	central	in	determining	the	scope	and	success	of	publishing	repertoires,	live	tours,	the	demand	for	merchandise,	studio	budgets	and	the	media	appearances	of	performers.	The	recording	-	on	CD,	as	download,	as	stream	-	loses	worth	as	industrial	product,	as	a	saleable	tangible	commodity	and	as	a	cultural	symbol.	Within	the	digital	economy	recording	acquires	new	exchange	values	as	content	and	as	data	commodity,	and	new	use	values	for	consumers	in	the	ubiquitous	sonic	stream	(through	subscriptions,	apps,	playlists	for	leisure	activities	and	so	on).			
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As	musicians	and	music	companies	abandon	their	dependence	upon	income	from	recordings,	and	pursue	multiple	sources	of	revenue,	so	the	music	industries	become	less	unified,	less	dependent	upon	a	shared	stake	in	recording	as	the	route	to	success,	and	more	splintered	into	sectional	interests.	This	can	be	illustrated	with	two	examples	from	different	parts	of	the	world	–	the	UK	and	China.			In	its	Measuring	Music	Report	(2017),	UK	Music	-	the	trade	organisation	that	represents	music	companies	-	recognises	this	lack	of	unity	by	dividing	the	‘music	industry’	into	six	‘core	sectors.’	These	are	musicians,	composers,	songwriters	and	lyricists;	recorded	music;	live	music;	music	publishing;	music	representatives;	music	producers,	recording	studios	and	staff.	The	core	sectors	are	further	broken	down	in	to	‘sub	sectors’.	So,	for	example,	recorded	music	is	sub-divided	into	three	categories	(record	labels;	online	music	distributors;	design	and	manufacture	of	physical	product	and	packaging).	Live	music	is	broken	down	into	four	categories	(music	festival	organisers,	music	promoters,	music	agents;	production	services	for	live	music;	ticketing	agents;	concert	venues	and	arenas).	In	2016	recording	was	contributing	14	per	cent	of	total	music	industry	revenues	to	the	UK	economy,	with	live	music	at	23	per	cent.	Recording	accounted	for	only	6	per	cent	of	those	employed	within	the	UK	‘music	industry’	(UK	Music,	2017).	UK	Music,	whilst	seeking	to	lobby	and	campaign	on	behalf	of	a	coherent	singular	‘music	industry’	recognises	that	recording	is	only	one	component	part	of	this	industry.		 In	a	similar	way,	the	2017	China	Music	Industry	Development	Report	(CUC,	2017)	divides	the	music	industry	into	three	‘segment	industries’:	A	‘core	layer’	contains	music	books	and	audiovisual	publishing	industry;	music	performance	industry;	music	copyright	brokerage	and	management;	digital	music	industry.	A	‘link	layer’	is	made	up	of	musical	instrument	industry;	music	education	and	training	industry;	professional	audio	industry.	An	‘expanding	layer’	contains	radio	and	TV	music	industry;	karaoke	industry;	film,	television,	drama,	games,	animation	music.	The	digital	music	industry	accounts	for	16	per	pent	of	total	revenues,	with	Karaoke	accounting	for	27	per	cent,	musical	instruments	at	12	per	cent	and	music	books	and	audiovisual	publishing	(physical	artefacts)	at	under	half	a	per	cent.		 Only	taking	examples	from	two	territories	shows	that	recording	is	one	element	within	the	overall	music	industries	(it	would	be	instructive	to	broaden	these	comparisons	
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with	other	music	industries	around	the	world).	It	also	illustrates	how	the	music	industries	in	anyone	place	are	shaped	by	the	interplay	of	cultural	and	commercial	contexts.	Important	core	industry	sectors	in	China	do	not	feature	in	UK	Music’s	core	music	sectors,	for	example.	Although	the	Communist	Party	of	China,	through	various	committees	and	councils,	seeks	to	‘strengthen	the	integration	of	the	music	industry	with	other	industries’	(p17),	and	although	UK	Music	has	a	political	mission	to	‘represent	the	collective	interests	of	the	recorded,	published	and	live	arms	of	the	British	music	industry’	(as	stated	on	its	website),	it	is	no	longer	plausible	to	argue	for	a	‘music	industry’	characterised	by	a	concentration	of	shared	interests	(Azenha,	2006)	or	strategically	advantageous	structures	of	‘vertical’	and	‘horizontal	integration’	(Bishop,	2005).			The	music	industries	are	active	through	specific	businesses	and	companies,	interest	groups,	occupations	and	organisations,	and	these	may	be	grouped	into	loosely	themed	sectors	or	layers.	These	sectors	operate	within	looser	competing	and	collaborating	networks,	portfolios	of	businesses	structured	according	to	multiple	rights	models,	and	strategic	alliances.			These	disunified	music	industries	face	challenges	from	‘digital	positivism’	(Mosco,	2014)	as	the	digital	conglomerates	(and	nation	states)	seek	to	comprehend	and	manipulate	the	behaviour	of	musicians	and	listeners	by	extracting	and	using	data	derived	from	the	production,	circulation	and	use	of	recording.	But	the	post-record	music	industry	benefits,	as	do	all	music	industries,	from	the	way	music	continues	to	be	created	and	performed,	continues	to	be	created	and	performed,	exchanged	and	acclaimed,	experienced	and	enjoyed,	in	ways	that	escape	the	reduction	of	our	lives	to	data.		
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